Recitations for this course meet for 1 hour each Friday.
Calendar Schedule.
| Lec # |
Topics |
Key Dates |
| 1 |
Introduction to Game Theory |
|
| 2 |
Payoffs in Games: Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
Expected Utility Theory; Risk Aversion |
|
| 3-5 |
A More Formal Introduction to Games
Extensive Forms and Normal Forms
Strategies, Dominant Strategies and Iterative Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies
Nash Equilibrium
Applications of Nash Equilibrium |
|
| 6-8 |
Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
Analysis of Extensive-Form Games
Backward Induction
Subgame Perfection
Applications
Bargaining and Negotiations
Forward Induction
Applications |
Problem Set 1 due on Lecture 6
Problem Set 2 due two days after Lecture 8 |
| 9 |
Review |
|
| 10 |
In Class Midterm Exam 1 |
|
| 11-12 |
Repeated Games and Cooperation |
|
| 13-14 |
Incomplete Information
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Auctions
Applications |
Problem Set 3 due on Lecture 14 |
| 15-16 |
Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information |
Problem Set 4 due on Lecture 16 |
| 17 |
Review |
|
| 18 |
In Class Midterm Exam 2 |
|
| 19-21 |
Problems of Asymmetric Information in Economics
Signaling and the Intuitive Criterion
Applications of Signaling
The Principal-Agent Problem
Applications; Lemons, Efficiency Wages, Credit-Rationing, Price-Discrimination |
Problem Set 5 due on Lecture 21 |
| 22-23 |
Global Games |
|
| 24-25 |
Evolutionary Foundations of Equilibrium
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Replicator Dynamics |
Problem Set 6 due on Lecture 25 |
| 26-27 |
Applications and Review
Final Exam |
|